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ABSTRACT   
I discuss the relevance of the current predicament in cosmology to the debate over scientific real-
ism. I argue that the existence of two, empirically successful but ontologically inconsistent cos-
mological theories presents difficulties for the realist position. 
 
1. Introduction
     Richard Boyd (1984, pp. 41-42) summarizes what he calls the “four central theses” of scien-
tific realism: 
1. Theoretical terms in scientific theories (i.e., nonobservational terms) should be thought 
of as putatively referring expressions; that is, scientific theories should be interpreted 
“realistically". 
2. Scientific theories, interpreted realistically, are confirmable and in fact are often con-
firmed as approximately true by ordinary scientific evidence interpreted in accordance 
with ordinary methodological standards. 
3. The historical progress of mature sciences is largely a matter of successively more ac-
curate approximations to the truth about both observable and unobservable phenome-
na. Later theories typically build upon the (observational and theoretical) knowledge 
embodied in previous theories. 
4. The reality which scientific theories describe is largely independent of our thoughts or 
theoretical commitments.  
A commitment to scientific realism is often accompanied by a particular set of epistemic com-
mitments, or attitudes, as well (e.g. Smart 1963; Psillos 1999; Lipton 2004; Niiniluoto 2018): 
• The existence of empirical equivalents to current scientific theories — theories that differ in 
important ways from those theories but that make the same, or nearly the same, predictions 
about observable phenomena — would be difficult to reconcile with theses 1-3, and realists 
tend toward the view that such equivalents must be contrived or artificial, if they exist at all. 
_______________________ 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• Bold new conjectures, of the sort that led to the theory of relativity or to quantum mechanics, 
can (if successful) require abrupt changes in ontology, and in so doing would conflict with all 
of 1-4. Scientific realists understand “mature” science as progressing according to a gentler, 
typically inductivist, logic of discovery, e.g. `abduction’ or `inference to the best explanation’ 
rather than through bold new conjectures.  
• Theses 1 and 4 imply that the entities described by current theories actually exist. Since the 
descriptions of those entities — particularly, of the unobservable (or unobserved) entities — 
tend to change over time, scientific realists are motivated to search for referential or ontologi-
cal continuity: to argue that the same entities are being described in spite of changes in the the-
oretical statements that refer to them.  
The current, standard theory of cosmology (the ΛCDM model) qualifies as a mature theory, 
and it is judged by most cosmologists to be empirically successful as well (Longair 2006; Pee-
bles 2020). That theory postulates the existence of dark matter and it claims that most of the mat-
ter in the universe is dark. An alternative theory (MOND, for MOdified Newtonian Dynamics) 
does not postulate the existence of dark matter. It would probably not be correct to say (as dis-
cussed in more detail below) that MOND is precisely empirically equivalent to the standard 
model, at least if empirical equivalence is defined in terms of all possible observable conse-
quences. But it has become clear over the last few years that MOND is at least as successful as 
the standard model at explaining existing observations, including observations that are believed 
by many standard-model cosmologists to necessarily imply the existence of dark matter. Fur-
thermore the MONDian explanations often require (far) fewer auxiliary hypotheses than are re-
quired under the standard model; and in a number of important instances, MOND has anticipated 
the data: that is: it has made successful, novel predictions, some of which were extremely sur-
prising from a standard-model perspective. At least since the addition of the dark matter postu-
lates c. 1980, the standard cosmological model has rarely, if ever, managed to do that; its suc-
cesses have almost always been successes of post-hoc accommodation rather than of prior pre-
diction. 
The ΛCDM model is undeniably still the `standard’ cosmological theory: it is the theory that 
is taught in graduate schools and enshrined in the textbooks. But the existence of an (arguably) 
more successful and (arguably) less ad hoc alternative theory would seem to provide grist for the 
anti-realist position that current theories, even mature and successful ones, are at risk of being 
replaced by new ones, by theories that differ in their ontological commitments but are at least as 
well confirmed by the evidence as the ones they would replace. 
My aim here is to use modern cosmology as a case study for current ideas about scientific 
realism. In Section 2 I summarize the two cosmological theories and argue that, while the theo-
ries come close to satisfying the condition of empirical equivalence, this judgment is complicated 
by the different ways in which they attain correspondence with the observations, particularly ob-
servations on the scale of individual galaxies. Section 3 considers the possibility of identifying 
referential continuity between the two theories with regard to the entity called ‘dark matter’ in 
the standard model. I argue that ‘dark matter’ is invoked in (at least) two, quite distinct, ways by 
standard-model cosmologists in explaining data, and that it is reasonable to claim continuity of 
reference only in the case of one of the two `dark matters’. In Section 4 I question realists’ com-
mitment to abductive reasoning given that the (putatively) abductive explanation of the galaxy 
rotation-curve anomaly (’dark matter’) has been far less fruitful than MOND at generating suc-
cessful novel predictions. Finally in Section 5 I discuss two arguments that have been made for a 
realistic interpretation of theories and argue that both arguments support a realistic interpretation 
of Milgrom’s theory, but in so doing, conflict with the realists’ view that mature theories in the 
physical scientists are likely to be correct. 
2. Two cosmological theories
     The standard, or ΛCDM, model of cosmology assumes the correctness of Einstein’s theory of 
gravity and motion (or of Newton’s, in the appropriate regimes) but it supplements that theory 
with a raft of auxiliary hypotheses, including postulates about the existence and properties of 
`dark matter’ and `dark energy’ and about an early epoch of rapid cosmological evolution (`infla-
tion’). The dark matter and dark energy postulates are responses to observations that (in a Pop-
perian sense) falsified the theory as it existed at the time: the discovery in the 1970s that the rota-
tion curves of spiral galaxies do not behave as Newton’s laws predict (Rubin, Ford & Thonnard 
1978; Bosma 1981) and the discovery in the 1990s that the expansion of the universe does not 
behave as Einstein’s laws predict (Riess et al. 1998; Perlmutter et al. 1999). Both dark matter and 
dark energy qualify as unobserved (and, possibly, unobservable) entities, and indeed the assumed 
properties of both have been modified over time in response to new observations, under the con-
tinued assumption that Einstein’s (or Newton’s) theory of gravity is correct. In Lakatosian (1978) 
terms, those theories of gravity constitute part of the `hard core’ of the standard cosmological 
research program, and the auxiliary hypotheses relating to dark matter and dark energy have been 
crafted (and re-crafted) in such a way as to `shield’ the hard core from refutation. 
The competing cosmological theory, due in its original form to Mordehai Milgrom 
(1983a,b,c), does not postulate the existence of dark matter. That theory (variously called `modi-
fied Newtonian dynamics,’ `Milgromian dynamics,’ or `MOND’) postulates a different theory of 
gravity and motion. 
One normally associates the science of cosmology with a global theory of the universe: of its 
large-scale structure and its evolution. But it is appropriate, and useful, to look first at the more 
local predictions of both theories. Both the postulates of Milgrom, and the standard-model postu-
lates relating to dark matter, were initially targeted toward anomalies that appear on distance 
scales corresponding to single galaxies or groups of galaxies, regimes in which a non-relativistic 
theory was believed (and is still believed) to be adequate. 
2.1 Prediction vs. accommodation
Newton’s laws relate the gravitational acceleration of a test mass (the rate of change of its 
velocity) to the spatial distribution of matter that produces the gravitational force acting on it. In 
the case of a disk galaxy, the Newtonian prediction is particularly straightforward to test, because 
the stars and gas in the disk (like the Sun, in the Milky Way) are observed to move in nearly cir-
cular orbits about the disk center; and because the distribution of matter that is responsible for 
the gravitational force has a nearly planar geometry and so it can be robustly inferred given the 
observed, two-dimensional distribution of surface brightness (or of gas emission) on the plane of 
the sky. 
Although the fact was not generally appreciated at the time (the late 1970s), observations of 
spiral galaxy rotation curves were the first tests of Newton’s laws in a new regime: the regime of 
low acceleration. `Acceleration’ can here be taken to mean the centripetal acceleration a = V2/R 
of a test body moving (at speed V) in a circular orbit (of radius R); or the gravitational accelera-
tion per unit of mass, expressed as the gradient of the gravitational potential, gN = -∇𝚽. Under 
Newton’s laws, these two can be equated: 
V2/R = ⎮∇𝚽⎮. (1) 
Furthermore the gravitational potential follows from the observed distribution of mass via Pois-
sion’s equation. The resultant expressions for a disk-like distribution of matter are mathematical-
ly involved and it is common in elementary treatments (like this one) to approximate the disk as 
a sphere, for which  
V2/R ≣ a = GM(R)/R2 ≣ gN        (2)
with M(R) the mass enclosed within a sphere of radius R. The Newtonian prediction for the rota-
tion curve, V (R), is then something like 
V (R) ≈ √[GM(R)/R] .        (3) 
In many galaxies, the Newtonian prediction for V (R) is found to be reasonably well corroborated 
near the center. But sufficiently far from the center, the observed values of V always exceed the 
predicted values, and the discrepancy exhibits two regularities: (i) the large-radius behavior of V 
is V (R) ⟹ constant = Vf, that is, rotation curves are `asymptotically flat’, rather than the as-
ymptotic V (R) ∝ 1/√R  dependence predicted by Equation (3); and (ii) in a given galaxy, depar-
tures from the Newtonian prediction first become noticeable at radii where the acceleration drops 
below a value ∼10-10 m s-2. The former regularity—the asymptotic flatness of galaxy rotation 
curves—was recognized, and widely discussed, already by 1980 (e.g. Faber & Gallagher 1979); 
the latter became clear only later, during tests of Milgrom’s theory. 
Standard-model cosmologists responded to the rotation-curve anomaly by postulating the ex-
istence of dark matter: matter that produces (and responds to) gravitational force but does not 
interact with photons. The presence of dark matter in or around galaxy disks is assumed to gen-
erate the additional gravitational force needed to explain the anomalously high rotation speeds. 
Standard-model cosmologists do not always present the existence of dark matter as a hypothesis; 
for instance, Peter Schneider (2015, p. 77) writes: “The rotation curves of spiral galaxies are flat 
up to the maximum radius at which they can be measured; spiral galaxies contain dark 
matter” (italics his). However Milgrom (1989, p. 216) has noted, correctly, that standard-model 
cosmologists routinely (if implicitly) assume the correctness of what he calls the “dark matter 
hypothesis”, or DMH, which “states that dark matter is present in whatever quantities and space 
distribution is needed to explain away whichever mass discrepancy arises.” 
Milgrom (1983a) proposed a different explanation of the rotation-curve anomaly: a modifica-
tion of Newton’s laws. He postulated the existence of a new constant of nature, a0 (`Milgrom’s 
constant’), with value a0 ≈ 10-10 m s-2, and proposed that the relation between centripetal acceler-
ation in galaxy disks, and the gravitational acceleration (force per unit of mass) due to the ob-
served matter, was different from Newton’s in regimes where a ≲ a0. In the low-accleration 
regime, Milgrom’s modified dynamics predict that galaxy rotation curves will be flat; Milgrom 
has acknowledged (1983a) that he designed his modified dynamics to yield this known result. 
But the same postulates that imply asymptotic flatness also imply that the gravitational accelera-
tion should be uniquely predictable given the distribution of normal (non-dark) matter, in all 
regimes of acceleration, not just the asymptotic limit. The mathematical form of the relation be-
tween source mass and acceleration was left unspecified, except in the asymptotic regime, but 
Milgrom’s prediction of a unique relation has been confirmed in various ways; most strikingly in 
the form of the so-called `radial-acceleration relation’ (RAR) for galaxy disks (McGaugh et al. 
2016). Given the RAR, which plots gN (the Newtonian acceleration based on the observed mat-
ter) against the observed centripetal acceleration a, the functional relation between the two quan-
tities can be `read off’, thus extending the predictability of Milgrom’s postulates to regions of 
arbitrary acceleration. One finds that the modified dynamics accurately predicts rotation curves 
at all radii in all galaxies (e.g. Li et al. 2018). The latter include galaxies which (according to a 
standard-model cosmologist) are `dark matter dominated’, such as dwarf spheroidal galaxies: 
Milgrom predicted, and the data confirm, that the stars and gas in such galaxies orbit about the 
center in a manner that is predictable given the observed distribution of normal matter alone, a 
result that is (to put it mildly) extremely surprising from a standard-model perspective. 
One’s first reaction on hearing that anomalous data have been explained by modifying the 
theory of gravity is likely to be, “What an ad hoc solution!” But it should be clear from the pre-
ceding discussion that quite the opposite is true. The standard model `explains’ rotation curves by 
simply postulating (in Milgrom’s words) that “dark matter is present in whatever quantities and 
space distribution is needed.” Whereas Milgrom’s theory predicts rotation curves, even though it 
was not designed to do so. There still exists no algorithm, under the standard model, that is capa-
ble of making such predictions, successfully or otherwise. Standard-model cosmologists treat 
rotation-curve data as part of the `background knowledge’ and distribute the dark matter as need-
ed to accommodate it. 
This discussion suggests why the two theories are approximately, though never exactly, 
equivalent in their predictions. They are approximately equivalent because both theories assign a 
gravitational potential (real in the case of dark matter; effective in the case of MOND) to a given 
galaxy that is consistent with its measured, internal kinematics. The equivalence is only approx-
imate, however, because while MOND assigns a unique, 3d gravitational field to a given galaxy, 
there are many 3d dark matter distributions that are consistent with a specified rotation curve, or 
any finite set of measured velocities. A default assumption is to put the dark matter into a spheri-
cal `halo,’ but if kinematical data for stars or gas outside the disk are found to be inconsistent 
with the assumption of spherical symmetry, the shape of the halo can be (and often is) adjusted, 
in such a way that the forces in the disk plane, hence V(R), remain fixed while forces outside the 
disk plane are modified.  
An illustration of this difference is the so-called `central surface density relation,’ or CSDR, 
another successful, novel prediction of Milgrom’s theory (Brada & Milgrom 1999; Milgrom 
2016; Lelli et al. 2016b). Given the observed distribution of normal matter in a disk galaxy, one 
can compute the unique, `phantom dark matter’ distribution that would yield the same test-parti-
cle trajectories, under Newton’s laws, as predicted by the modified dynamics. This phantom halo 
is what a standard-model cosmologist would call `dark matter’: its density and shape are what 
would be inferred by a standard-model theorist given enough kinematical data for the galaxy. 
Furthermore the phantom dark matter can be shown to obey certain simple regularities: there is a 
unique, functional, relation between the central surface density of the phantom halo and the sur-
face density of the disk (the CSDR) and there is an approximate upper limit to the surface densi-
ty of the phantom dark matter associated with any galaxy. No such results are entailed by the 
standard model. Indeed the first observational corroboration of the upper-limit prediction (Dona-
to et al. 2009) was met with surprise by the standard model cosmologists who undertook the 
study and who were, apparently, unaware of Milgrom’s prediction. 
The successful prediction of galaxy rotation curves, and of the CSDR, are two examples of 
how Milgrom’s theory `anticipates the data’.  Another is the so-called `baryonic Tully-Fisher re1 -
lation’ (BTFR) illustrated in Figure 1. Already in 1983 Milgrom noted that his postulates imply a 
unique, that is, a functional, relation between the total mass (normal, not dark) of a disk galaxy 
and its asymptotic rotation speed: 
Vf = (GMgal a0)1/4 ∝ Mgal1/4                                                                                                              (4)    
with Mgal the normal (non-dark) mass of a galaxy. The existence of such a relation was not 
known prior to 1983 nor had its existence been predicted by standard-model cosmologists, who 
would expect Vf to be determined almost entirely by the dark mass of a galaxy. It is probably for 
this reason that the relation was first confirmed observationally by researchers engaged in tests of 
the Milgromian prediction (Lelli et al. 2016a). 
     While standard-model cosmologists can not predict Vf for any observed galaxy, they have in-
vested considerable effort into simulating galaxy formation and evolution, and those simulations 
sometimes have high enough spatial resolution that one can extract information about the rota-
tion curves of the simulated galaxies. The dominant component by mass in such simulations is 
the dark matter, represented as a dust-like, `collisionless’ fluid (as would be the case if it consist-
ed of weakly self-interacting particles). The most sophisticated simulations include also a `bary-
onic’ component representing the normal matter (stars, gas); the normal matter reacts to the pres-
ence of the dark matter through the latter’s gravitational force.  Non-gravitational phenomena 
involving the normal matter—radiative heating and cooling, star formation and evolution, stellar 
winds, gas turbulence etc.—can be extraordinarily complicated and are often poorly understood, 
and furthermore their effects are often determined in substantial ways by processes that occur on  
 Merritt (2020) gives a comprehensive list of successful, novel predictions of Milgrom’s theory; see also McGaugh 1
(2020).
 
Figure 1. A confirmed, novel prediction of Milgrom's theory (left) compared with a recent attempt 
to explain it under the standard cosmological model (right). The left panel plots total (`baryonic’, 
i.e., non-dark) mass versus asymptotic rotation speed for a sample of observed disk galaxies: the 
`baryonic Tully-Fisher relation’ (BTFR). The best-fit line is indistinguishable from the Milgromi-
an prediction (Eq. 4). Points are color-coded according to the galaxy’s mass fraction in gas, which 
tends to increase downward (toward lower mass). The right panel plots results from a large-scale 
simulation of galaxy formation. The standard cosmological model makes no testable prediction 
about this relation, and simulators are free to define the horizontal axis as they see fit. This plot 
uses three different measures of the rotation speed: Vc is the circular velocity at twice the `baryon-
ic’ half-mass radius in the simulated galaxy; Vmax is the maximum circular velocity; and Vout is the 
circular speed at the outermost measured point in the rotation curve. The solid curve labelled 
“Vmax” shows median values for the entire sample of simulated galaxies as a function of total 
baryonic mass. The simulated relation differs from the observed/predicted relation in terms of 
both functional form and scatter, whether expressed in terms of Vmax or Vout. Left panel: figure 
reprinted with permission from F. Lelli et al., “The baryonic Tully-Fisher relation for different 
velocity definitions and implications for galaxy angular momentum,” Monthly Notices of the 
Royal Astronomical Society, 484, 2019, p. 3267. Right panel: Figure reprinted with permission 
from L. V. Sales et al., “The low-mass end of the baryonic Tully–Fisher relation,” Monthly No-
tices of the Royal Astronomical Society, 464, 2017, p. 2419. 
spatial scales that are far too small to be treated directly in the galaxy formation simulations. 
Such `baryonic’ processes are therefore treated by (sometimes extreme) approximation; for in-
stance, the effects of a supernova blast on the surrounding gas might be represented by a single 
parameter, the `efficiency,’ that determines what fraction of the explosive energy or momentum 
is transferred to the surrounding gas (e.g. Governato et al. 2010). 
It is widely acknowledged, even by standard-model cosmologists, that such simulations are 
not predictive. The goal is rather to explain, in a retrospective fashion, known, systematic proper-
ties of galaxies: and, hopefully, to do so without the need to select very extreme or unreasonable 
values for the parameters that specify the baryonic processes (Merritt 2021b). It sometimes hap-
pens that years, or even decades, of code refinement are required before the hoped-for results are 
obtained. The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates how close (or far) the best current simulations 
come to reproducing the BTFR that was successfully predicted by Milgrom in 1983.  2
This difference between the way in which Milgromian, and standard-model, theorists explain 
the observations relating to galaxies—prediction in one case, accommodation in the other—is 
one reason why it is not really possible to decide whether the two theories are empirically equiv-
alent, even if `equivalence’ is restricted to existing observations.  But questions of equivalence 
aside, there are several arguments that support the claim that the Milgromian explanations of data 
like those plotted in Figure 1 are epistemically superior to the standard-model explanations: 
• As just noted, while Milgrom’s theory makes definite, testable predictions about the behavior 
of the observable matter in individual galaxies, the standard model can at best make statistical 
statements about the behavior of the matter in simulated galaxies.  
• Standard-model simulations fail to adequately reproduce many systematic properties of gal-
axies that are correctly predicted by Milgrom’s theory. Figure 1 shows one example; see Silk & 
Mamon (2012), Bullock & Boylan-Kolchin (2017) and Tulin & Wu (2018) for others.  
• Even if standard-model cosmologists should manage to retrospectively explain facts success-
fully predicted by Milgrom’s theory, one can argue that such explanations are always more ad 
hoc. There is widespread acknowledgement by philosophers of science that the successful pre-
diction of a fact assigns more warrant to a theory than any post-hoc accommodation of that 
fact. For instance, Lipton (2004, p. 170), in a passage that is perfectly apposite here, writes: 
When data need to be accommodated, there is a motive to force a theory and auxiliaries 
to make the accommodation. The scientist knows the answer she must get, and she does 
whatever it takes to get it. … In the case of prediction, by contrast, there is no motive for 
fudging, since the scientist does not know the right answer in advance. She will instead 
make her prediction on the basis of the most natural and most explanatory theory and 
 Milgromian researchers can carry out such simulations as well, and in so doing may invoke auxiliary hypotheses; 2
for instance, a simulation of the chemical evolution of the interstellar medium might require assumptions about 
modes of enrichment due to stellar winds. But a simulation under MOND will (almost) always require fewer auxil-
iary hypotheses than under the standard model since there will be no need to account for the degrees of freedom 
associated with dark matter. For instance, in the chemical enrichment simulation, a Milgromian will know precisely 
what the escape speed is from every point in her simulated galaxy, while for the standard-model researcher that 
quantity depends on the assumed mass and extent of the `dark matter halo.’ And for many questions concerning gal-
axies, MOND yields answers that are completely independent of a galaxy’s origin or evolution. That is almost never 
the case under the standard model.
auxiliaries she can produce. As a result, if the prediction turns out to have been correct, it 
provides stronger reason to believe the theory that generated it.  
Psillos (1999, p. 107) writes: 
For there is always the possibility that a known fact can be `forced’ into a theory, whereas 
a theory cannot be forced to yield an hitherto unknown fact. Hence, predicting a new ef-
fect — whose existence falls naturally out of a theory — makes the theory more risky and 
susceptbile to extra experimental scrutiny which may refute it. 
And Worrall (1985, p. 313) suggests that “when one theory has accounted for a set of facts by 
parameter-adjustment, while a rival accounts for the same facts directly and without contrivance, 
then the rival does, but the first does not, derive support from those facts.” 
In summary: In explaining observations on the spatial scales that correspond to galaxies, the 
two theories are empirically equivalent only in the sense that the standard model sometimes 
manages to accommodate, in an approximate way, facts that are successfully predicted by Mil-
grom’s theory. In effect, standard-model cosmologists use dark matter as a `MOND emulator’: 
they require dark matter to have whatever macroscopic properties (density, velocity dispersion, 
spatial distribution) are needed in order to make the behavior of the normal matter in any ob-
served galaxy mimic its behavior under the modified dynamics. And in computer simulations of 
the formation and evolution of galaxies, where the dark matter is allowed to evolve freely in re-
sponse to gravity, the description of the normal matter is uncertain enough, due to physical pro-
cesses that occur on `sub-grid’ spatial scales, that the simulator has substantial freedom to adjust 
its behavior and again obtain (or at least, try to obtain) agreement with the observations. 
2.2 Particle dark matter
The standard cosmological model postulates the existence of an entity — dark matter — that 
does not exist (at least, not necessarily) in Milgrom’s theory. 
For the moment, I will assume, as standard-model cosmologists almost universally do  (e.g. 
Tanabashi et al. 2018), that the dark matter consists of elementary particles. The standard cosmo-
logical model says little about the expected properties of the dark particles: only that (i) their 
mean mass density should be high enough to constitute approximately 85% of the universe’s 
overall mass budget; and that (ii) the particles should have been moving slowly enough, at early 
times, that they were able to gravitationally cluster into structures with sizes and masses compa-
rable to those of galaxies and galaxy groups (`cold dark matter,’ or CDM). A third assumption is 
often made that (iii) the particles are weakly self-interacting; that is: that they respond to gravita-
tional forces as a collisionless fluid. (The latter assumption is almost always built in to galaxy 
formation simulations like those described in the previous section.) No particle has yet been 
identified that fits these requirements and it is generally believed that any such particle must lie 
outside of the standard model of particle physics. 
Nevertheless a number of potentially testable consequences follow from the hypothesis that 
the dark matter consists of elementary particles. Probably best known is the prediction that dark 
particles are passing, at every instant, through any terrestrial laboratory  and could in principle be 3
detected, using well-established techniques of calorimetry, scintillation or ionization. Experi-
ments designed to detect the particles (so-called `direct detection’ experiments) have been carried 
out since the early 1980s; about a half-dozen such experiments are currently underway (e.g. 
Kisslinger & Das 2019). There is intersubjective agreement that no event has yet been observed 
that can reasonably be interpreted as the signal of a dark particle passing through a laboratory 
detector (Liu et al. 2017; Ko 2018; Schumann 2019).  
An independent set of experiments — the `indirect detection’ experiments — look for evi-
dence of radiation from particle dark matter beyond the Earth (Funk 2015; Gaskins 2016): typi-
cal targets are the center of the Milky Way, and the dwarf (`dark-matter-dominated’) satellite gal-
axies of the Milky Way. The (additional) assumption here is that the dark particles are either self-
annihilating, or decaying, and in the process producing energetic, standard-model particles (e.g. 
neutrinos) or gamma-ray photons that could be detected from the Earth. Here the major experi-
mental challenge is the difficulty of distinguishing any detected photons or neutrinos from those 
produced by known astrophysical sources, e.g. pulsars, in the targeted systems (Buckley et al. 
2013; Strigari et al. 2018). Although claims have been made from time to time of a detection, 
more careful modeling of the `astrophysical’ (i.e., non-dark-matter) sources in the target object 
always ends up casting doubt on the dark-matter interpretation. For instance, an apparent excess 
of gamma rays from the direction of the Galactic center was proposed as a signal of dark matter 
(Hooper and Goodenough 2011), but a recent analysis (Abazajian et al. 2020, p. 043012) con-
cludes that “the excess emission in the GC [Galactic center] at GeV energies is dominantly of 
astrophysical origin“ and not due to dark matter.   
Now, one could argue for empirical equivalence here in the following sense: Milgrom’s theo-
ry predicts that direct- and indirect-detection experiments should measure no signal—consistent 
with all experimental results to date—and the standard cosmological can accommodate the lack 
of detections by adjusting the assumed properties of the putative particles. For instance, the 
cross-section of interaction of the dark particles with normal matter can be assumed to be very 
small, making direct detection essentially impossible even if the particles are present in the de-
tector; or, the decay lifetime of the particles can be assumed to be so long that decay products 
would almost never be observed. Just these explanations for the persistent non-detection are, in 
fact, often proposed. In much the same way that standard-model cosmologists adjust the as-
sumed, macroscopic properties of the dark matter in order to accommodate the observed behav-
ior of stars and gas in galaxies, they can also adjust the assumed microscopic properties of the 
dark particles to accommodate the negative results from the direct- and indirect-detection exper-
iments. 
 Or, in the past, through any terrestrial dinosaur (Randall 2015).3
2.3 The early universe and large-scale structure 
It was noted above that dark matter appears in the standard cosmological model in two dis-
tinct ways: (i) its presence is assumed in galaxies whenever the observed, internal motions are 
inconsistent with the predictions of Newton; (ii) it is postulated that at some early time, before 
galaxies formed, the universe was filled with a nearly uniform dark-matter `fluid’ which subse-
quently evolved in response to gravitational forces. 
In galaxy formation simulations like those described above, the second assumption is used to 
set the initial conditions of the simulation. The final result of such a simulation may include a set 
of (simulated) galaxies, each of which consists, typically, of a dark matter `halo’ at the center of 
which sits the normal matter making up the simulated galaxy. 
Such simulations say nothing about the dark or luminous matter in any observed galaxy. But 
they do permit a sort of statistical consistency check between postulates (i) and (ii), in the fol-
lowing sense: the simulated galaxies of some specified `type’ (e.g. low-mass, gas-rich, rapidly-
rotating) should inhabit dark-matter halos that are consistent in their properties (mass, shape, 
density profile) with the dark matter halos that are required, under postulate (i), to accommodate 
the observed kinematics of the same type of galaxy.  
The simulations often fail such consistency tests: the simulators often fail to find any reason-
able set of parameters (describing the `sub-grid physics’) that can accommodate known, system-
atic, properties of galaxies, including properties correctly predicted by Milgrom’s theory (Silk & 
Mamon 2012; Bullock & Boylan-Kolchin 2017; Tulin & Wu 2018). 
But there is another set of tests that relate more directly to postulate (ii), and these are the 
tests that standard-model cosmologists typically point to when they claim that the evidence for 
dark matter is irrefutable. The first is the power-spectrum of temperature fluctuations in the so-
called cosmic microwave background (CMB): the universe-filling radiation that is believed to 
consist of photons produced during the epoch of recombination, a few hundred thousand years 
after the Big Bang, when the universe transitioned from an opaque plasma to a transparent neu-
tral gas. The various features in the CMB spectrum are interpreted, by standard-model cosmolo-
gists, as imprints in the photon energies due to slight variations in the gravitational potential 
through which the photons traveled in reaching the earth (among other possible processes). 
Those variations in the gravitational potential, in turn, are attributed to fluctuations in the density 
of matter, including both normal and dark matter, about their mean values at early times. The 
second test is the matter power spectrum (MPS), the Fourier transform of the matter correlation 
function, a measure of the clumpiness of the galaxy distribution on large spatial scales, hence 
early times. 
By freely adjusting a set of parameters, standard-model cosmologists are able to achieve 
good fits to the CMB and MPS data (e.g. Weinberg 2008, chapter 2; Schneider 2015, chapter 8).  
When standard-model cosmologists quote a value for the mean density of dark (or normal) mat-
ter in the universe, they are almost always citing the so-called `concordance’ values obtained by 
fitting their model to these data. 
But these data can be fit without assuming the existence of dark matter. A relativistic general-
ization of Milgrom’s theory due to Skordis & Złośnik (2020), which they call RMOND, has been 
shown to reproduce essentially all of the observations that standard-model cosmologists attribute 
to dark matter, including the CMB spectrum, the matter power spectrum, and observations of 
gravitational lensing, as well as (in the quasi-Newtonian regime) galaxy-scale phenomena like 
the BTFR and the CSDR. In addition, RMOND satisfies the other conditions that an acceptable 
relativistic theory must meet: for instance, that gravitational waves should propogate at the same 
speed as electromagnetic waves, as recent observations imply. 
Neither theory can claim to have successfully predicted the CMB or MPS data. In the case of 
the standard model, it was recognized prior to the observations that in the absence of dark matter, 
the peaks in the CMB spectrum should have progressively lower amplitudes due to a process 
called `baryonic damping’. However no theorist came close to correctly predicting the ampli-
tudes of the second or third peaks before they were measured; indeed the amplitude of the second 
peak, when first measured in 2002 (de Bernardis et al. 2002), was much lower than expected. In 
order to accommodate the unexpectedly low amplitude of the second peak, standard-model cos-
mologists were forced to increase the assumed density of normal matter by a factor of two above 
existing, well-established, estimates, introducing inconsistencies in their model that have persist-
ed until today. 
Standard-model cosmologists have often justified their non-acceptance of Milgrom’s theory 
on the grounds of its supposed inability to fit data like the CMB temperature fluctuation spec-
trum or the matter power spectrum. For instance, Dodelson (2011), in discussing an early rela-
tivistic version of MOND, wrote: 
The class of models reducing to MOdified Newtonian Dynamics (MOND) in the weak 
field limit does an excellent job fitting the rotation curves of galaxies, predicting the rela-
tion between baryonic mass and velocity in gas-dominated galaxies, and explaining the 
properties of the local group … The biggest challenge facing MOND today is the shape 
of the matter power spectrum…the shape of the predicted spectrum is in violent dis-
agreement with the observed shape.  
And standard-model cosmologist Ruth Durrer remarked “A theory must do really well to agree 
with [the CMB] data. This is the bottleneck.”  4
Skordis & Złosnik’s gravitational theory is a generalization of one published in 2004 by 
Jakob Bekenstein called `TeVeS’. (This is the theory that Dodelson referred to in the quotation 
above.) Their RMOND theory contains a term in the gravitational Lagrangian, a vector field 
(which they call B𝛍), that behaves differently in different regimes.  On the scale of the expanding 5
 Quoted in Wood (2020).4
 Somewhat confusingly, Skordis & Złosnik define two auxiliary fields which they call 𝜈1 and 𝜈2 and which appear 5
to contribute to the complexity of their Lagrangian. But these are `nondynamical’ fields that can be expressed in 
terms of the metric and the field B𝛍 ; they were introduced only to simplify the Lagrangian and they are later `inte-
grated out’. In Bekenstein’s (2004) `TeVeS’ Lagrangian, there is a nondynamical, auxiliary metric and a scalar field 
(called 𝜎) that can likewise be eliminated in terms of the physical metric and Bekenstein’s vector field, as shown in 
Złosnik, Ferreira, and Starkman (2006), yielding a Lagrangian that belongs to the same general family as that of 
Skordis & Złosnik.
universe, the field acts like collisionless dark matter, and the predictions in this regime for the 
behavior of observable matter and photons are essentially indistinguishable from those of the 
standard model. But on smaller scales where the expansion of the universe can be ignored, the 
field acts in such a way that the effective gravitational force reproduces Milgrom’s modified dy-
namics. 
One expects any version of MOND to contain a scalar term corresponding to Milgrom’s con-
stant a0. In RMOND, that (dimensionless) term is called KB. One of the notable successes of 
Skordis and Złosnik’s theory is that it naturally explains the several `cosmic coincidences’ first 
noted by Milgrom: the near-agreement of the magnitude of Milgrom’s constant with a number of 
other quantities that have dimensions of acceleration. 
Excellent fits to the CMB spectrum are obtainable using RMOND for a range of parameter 
values. In other words: the theory can explain those data without `fine tuning.’ Fits obtained un-
der the standard model, by contrast, are well known to be very strongly dependent on the as-
sumed parameter values; indeed the `precision’ with which such values are determinable from 
the data (under the standard model) is often cited as a primary justification for the (extremely 
expensive) experiments that are needed to obtain those data (e.g. The Planck Collaboration 
2006). 
Skordis & Złosnik do not view their theory as necessarily the final word, noting that any the-
ory like RMOND 
should obey the principle of general covariance and the Einstein equivalence principle. 
These are, however, rather generic and minimal principles that do not provide any guid-
ance as to how RMOND should look … Indeed, many theories obeying these have noth-
ing to do with MOND, and many RMOND theories obeying these same principles are in 
conflict with observations. 
Indeed, even summary discussions of the currently viable alternatives to Einstein’s general theo-
ry of relativity (most of which were not designed to yield the modified dynamics) can run to 
hundreds of pages (e.g. Clifton et  al. 2012).  
It is tempting to infer, from the clearly different forms of the gravitational action in the two 
theories, that they can not be exactly empirically equivalent. That inference is reasonable. For 
instance, MOND theories generically violate the strong equivalence principle, and indeed a claim 
has recently been made of an observational confirmation of this prediction (Chae et al. 2020). 
However a proper comparison of the empirical content of the two theories must take into account 
that the standard model includes `dark matter’ and `dark energy,’ and that the properties of those 
theoretical entities are only partially specified. If the two theories should be found to make sub-
stantially different predictions in some regime, it is always possible that the properties of dark 
matter or dark energy could be cleverly engineered so as to maintain empirical equivalence.  A 6
similar point can be made about comparison of the two theories in terms of their `simplicity’ or 
 An example is the effort currently underway to explore `self-interacting dark matter’ models; see e.g. the set of 6
papers in the special issue of Physics Reports, “Dark matter self-interactions and small scale structure” (volume 730, 
February 2018).
`elegance’: such comparisons must include, on the standard-model side, the (ever-changing) set 
of postulates that describe the properties of dark matter and dark energy as well as the many aux-
iliary hypotheses that are invoked to link the two `dark sectors’ to observable matter, hypotheses 
that are not necessary under MOND. 
In any case: Skordis and Złosnik’s work demonstrates that when it comes to explaining data 
like the CMB spectrum and the matter power spectrum, Milgromian theories that are empirically 
equivalent to the standard cosmological model can be constructed, and that such theories need be 
no more contrived or artificial than the standard model. 
3. Referential continuity
Scientific realists believe that mature, successful theories in the physical sciences are true or 
approximately true and that the entities that appear in those theories actually exist. If such a theo-
ry should be modified or replaced, the realist expects that the `same’ entities will be present in 
the new theory, even if the detailed descriptions of those entities, or the detailed manner in which 
the entities are related to observable phenomena, should change. In the words of Psillos (1999, p. 
281): 
If past mature and genuinely successful theories are to be seen as having been truth-like, 
then it should be the case at least that their central theoretical terms recognisably referred 
to those entities to which the theoretical terms in their successors also referred (or refer). 
In the case under consideration here, the “past theory” is, of course, the standard cosmological 
model, and the entity in question is dark matter. 
It would be difficult to overstate how strongly standard-model cosmologists associate the 
dark matter in their theory with elementary particles — even if they can not specify what kind of 
particles those are. For instance, Bertone & Hooper, in their “History of Dark Matter” (2018, p. 
045002-15), write that the phrase `dark matter’ 
is most frequently used as the name, a proper noun, of whatever particle species accounts 
for the bulk of our Universe’s matter density. When a modern paper discusses the distrib-
ution of dark matter, or the impact of dark matter on structure formation, or the prospects 
for detecting dark matter with a gamma-ray telescope, one does not have to ask them-
selves whether the authors might have in mind white dwarfs, neutron stars, or cold clouds 
of gas—they do not [italics added]. 
Almost as universal (at least until recently) has been the assumption that the postulated particles 
are massive and weakly interacting — hence the acronym WIMP, for `weakly interacting mas-
sive particle.’   7
 ‘Massive’ here means of order 102 GeV/c2; in the same units, the mass of the proton is 0.938. ‘Weakly interacting’ 7
means that the particles interact with other particles via a force that is as weak or weaker than the so-called `weak 
nuclear force’ (in addition to interacting via gravitational forces).
One indication of the standard-model commitment to particle dark matter is the enormous 
effort that has been expended by experimental (astro-)physicists in attempts to detect the dark 
particles. Those experiments are typically justified to the funding agencies on the grounds that 
dark matter is known to exist and that it very likely consists of WIMPs (e.g. Mount et al. 2017).  8
Had the experiments detected particles with the necessary properties, there would be no mo-
tivation to consider alternate theories of cosmology that lack dark matter. An `entity realist’ like 
Hacking (1983) or Cartwright (1999) could have argued that the dark particles are real, since we 
can manipulate them in our laboratories and intervene in their activities,  and the more pressing 9
question for scientific realists would have become: does the confirmed existence of the particles 
constitute a sufficient warrant for belief in the theory that invokes them (e.g. Clarke 2008)? 
But the direct-detection experiments have not been successful (Liu et al. 2017; Ko 2018; 
Kisslinger and Das 2019). Dark matter remains an unobserved, and possibly unobservable, enti-
ty: a theoretical entity. And so the primary question for the realist becomes: Given that an alter-
nate theory successfully explains the same data as the standard model, without invoking dark 
matter, is there some sense in which the `same’ entity is being described by the two theories? 
To the extent that standard-model cosmologists equate `dark matter’ with some (yet undis-
covered) elementary particle, one could reasonably argue that ontological continuity simply can 
not obtain between the standard model and Milgrom’s theory, since the latter does not postulate 
any such particle. But I propose to take a more liberal view here. Even standard-model cosmolo-
gists sometimes speculate about forms of dark matter that do not consist of WIMPs: for instance, 
axions, or black holes, or hydrogen snowballs. What is common to all these suggestions is the 
requirement that the postulated entities are able to explain the observations just as successfully as 
WIMPs have been shown to do. 
What this suggests, of course, is a causal (rather than a descriptivist) theory of reference.  10
Stanford (2006, p. 147) writes that “on causal theories of reference, a theoretical term refers to 
whatever entities in the world actually cause the observable phenomena or events that led past 
theorists to introduce the term into their theories in the first place.” Thus, for instance, a causal 
 A measure of the standard-model community’s commitment to particle dark matter is the amount of money ear8 -
marked by the funding agencies, year after year, for the detection experiments. The most elaborate experiment cur-
rently under development is called DARWIN: “The detector, estimated to cost between €100-million and €150 mil-
lion, is being developed by the international XENON collaboration, which runs one of the 3 experiments starting up 
this year — a 6-tonne detector called XENONnT at the Gran Sasso National Laboratory near Rome. DARWIN 
would contain almost ten times this volume of xenon” (Gibney 2020).
 Hacking, in 1989, wrote that his argument for entity realism “is evidently inapplicable to extragalactic astro9 -
physics” (p. 555) then went on to discuss the case of gravitational lensing. It is curious that he did not mention parti-
cle dark matter, in this paper or in any subsequent paper. Even before 1989, the possibility of detecting the dark par-
ticles experimentally had been widely discussed (e.g. Goodman & Witten 1985; Wasserman 1986) and the results 
from a number of ongoing experiments had been published (e.g. Ahlen et al. 1987; Caldwell et al. 1988).
 Cosmologists sometimes explicitly invoke a causal definition of dark matter. `Dark Matter Day’ is an annual 10
event first scheduled on 31 October 2017. The web page for that year’s event (https://www.bnl.gov/newsroom/
news.php?a=112325) stated “Finding out what dark matter is made of is a pressing pursuit in physics. We don’t yet 
know if it’s composed of undiscovered particles or whether it requires some other change in our understanding of 
the universe’s laws of physics.“ This example notwithstanding, standard-model cosmologists rarely apply the term 
`dark matter’ to alternate theories of gravity.
definition of reference would imply that the `luminiferous aether’ of 19th-century physics is what 
we now call the electromagnetic field (Hardin & Rosenberg 1982). 
An objection to making reference purely causal is that “continuity and sameness in reference 
becomes very easily satisfiable” (Psillos 1999, p. 290): there will always be something that is the 
cause of whatever phenomenon the theoretical term was introduced to explain, and so any entity 
introduced to explain that phenomenon will necessarily refer, even if the theory that contains the 
entity should turn out to be completely false.  
Kitcher (1993) argues that a causal definition of reference can be sharpened by distinguishing 
between what he calls “working posits” and “presuppositional posits.” The first refer to postu-
lates that are implicated in the theory’s empirical content, its “problem-solving schemata”; the 
latter to metaphysical concepts. Thus, he argues, the `aether’ was a presuppostional posit: its ex-
istence was not assumed in making or testing predictions (at least until the Michelson-Morley 
experiments); the successes of Maxwell’s theory were due entirely to the mathematical descrip-
tion of wave propagation, even if Maxwell himself professed a belief in the real existence of the 
aether. Thus, Kitcher argues, there is referential continuity between aether theories and theories 
of electromagnetic waves, even though the term `aether’ is no longer believed to refer. 
Following Psillos and Kitcher, we should ask in what manner the theoretical entity `dark mat-
ter’ relates causally to the observations that it is invoked to explain. And here it is necessary first 
to expand on a point that was discussed in passing in the previous section: 
A standard-model cosmologist who carries out computer simulations of galaxy formation sets 
her initial conditions by assuming that the universe was smoothly filled with dark matter at some 
early time. The end result of her calculation is a set of simulated galaxies each of which sits in-
side a `dark matter halo’ that formed from that same dark matter. At least conceptually, such sim-
ulations suggest a link between dark matter in the early universe and dark matter around nearby 
galaxies.  But if the same cosmologist is asked why she believes in the existence of dark matter, 11
she is unlikely to point to her simulations. She will refer instead to a particular set of observa-
tions—galaxy rotation curves, the CMB fluctuation spectrum—and cite the standard-model ex-
planations of those data that invoke dark matter. 
Those data, and their associated explanations in terms of dark matter, fall into two distinct 
sets, which might be called `local’ vs `global,’ or `small scale’ vs `large scale.’ Small-scale ob-
servations include the rotation curves of individual, nearby galaxies; such data are explained by 
postulating whatever amount and distribution of dark matter are needed to reconcile the observed 
motions with Newton’s laws (this is what Milgrom called the `dark matter hypothesis’, or DMH). 
Large-scale observations, like the CMB fluctuation spectrum and the matter power spectrum, are 
explained by postulating a universe-filling sea of dark matter at early times.  
A particle physicist who wishes to estimate the density of dark matter in his laboratory does 
not need to assume anything about the early universe; he simply refers to the Milky Way’s mea-
sured rotation curve and invokes the DMH. And a cosmologist who calculates the CMB spec-
 One might hope to connect the two hypotheses in some manner that does not depend on the details of the galaxy 11
formation simulations. For instance, the assumed, mean density of dark matter at early times ought to be related in a 
computable way to the mean density of dark matter in the local universe. But the latter is difficult to infer from data, 
since most of the postulated dark matter would be far from the centers of galaxies and so would have little effect on 
the observable matter.
trum does not care about dark matter in the Milky Way, or any other observed galaxy; his calcu-
lation does not invoke the DMH in any way. The two dark-matter postulates are independent in 
their entailments; predictions derived from them belong to two, non-overlapping sets — even 
though a standard-model researcher is likely to assume that both sorts of prediction, if confirmed, 
provide corroboration for a single entity, `dark matter.’ 
For a Milgromian researcher, who does not assume the existence of dark matter, there is no 
compelling reason to make this conceptual connection. So, for instance, he can consider explana-
tions for the large-scale data that are independent of his explanation of the local data. An exam-
ple is the demonstration by Angus (1999) that the CMB spectrum can be explained, even in a 
Milgromian cosmology, by postulating `sterile neutrino’ dark matter. The rms velocity of such 
particles would be too high for them to cluster into structures with the sizes and masses of single 
galaxies, hence they would not be implicated in the explanation of galaxy rotation curves—leav-
ing open the possibility of explaining those data via the modified dynamics rather than via the 
DMH. 
The relevance of this discussion to the question of referential continuity should be clear.  The 
two different explanatory roles that standard-model cosmologists assign, if only implicitly, to 
dark matter are likely to appear explicitly distinct in alternative theories like Angus’s. Those al-
ternate theories demonstrate what could have been clear already to standard-model cosmologists: 
that the explanations of the small-scale and large-scale phenomena are, or at least can be, discon-
nected, even if one imagines that the same entity (`dark matter’) is responsible for both. And so it 
is entirely possible (for instance) that continuity of reference between the standard model and an 
alternate theory could be satisfied for the entity that is deemed responsible for one set of phe-
nomena, but not for the other. 
With this in mind, we can now return to the question of how dark matter is causally invoked 
by standard-model cosmologists in their explanations. Consider first the case of the large-scale 
data. When cosmologists write computer programs for computing the CMB or matter power 
spectra,  `dark matter’ appears as a (numerically-specified) function ρ(𝒙,𝒗,𝑡) where ρ represents 
the mass density of the dark matter in phase space, (𝒙,𝒗) are phase-space coordinates and t is 
time. The function ρ is programmed to evolve as the dependent variable in the collisionless 
Boltzmann, or `Vlasov’, equation. That is: the dark-matter density evolves as if it were composed 
of a collection of particles that move in response to gravitational forces (from themselves and 
from other particles), without any additional inter-particle or radiative forces. 
The preceding sentence might be taken as defining the `core-causal’ description (Psillos 
1999, chapter 12) of dark matter: it contains all the elements that would need to be true in order 
for the entity to play the causal role that the theory requires of it. 
One can also identify properties that are not essential in order for `dark matter’ to play this 
causal role. The dark matter need not be particulate: indeed the Vlasov equation contains no term 
corresponding to `particle mass’ or number of particles. Such computer codes do often contain a 
variable that stands for the mass, 𝑚, of a dark particle, but that mass is used only in specifying 
the initial velocity field 𝒗(𝒙) of the dark matter, under the assumption that the initial velocities 
are `thermal’ and hence 𝑚-dependent. But in computing the CMB spectrum the initial velocity 
field is almost irrelevant; this is why, for instance, Angus (1999) could correctly predict those 
data using particles (neutrinos) of much lower mass than is normally assumed for WIMPs. 
Now, Skordis & Złosnik (2020), when motivating the mathematical form of their proposed 
gravitational action, state as a desirable feature that there be a “significant amount of energy den-
sity scaling precisely as a-3 ”, with a the cosmological scale factor, and note that “Within the DM 
[dark matter] paradigm such a law is a natural consequence of the energy density of particles 
obeying the collisionless Boltzmann equation.“ They go on to demonstrate that on the largest 
physical scales, their action contains a term that precisely mimics collisionless dark matter; and 
that by virtue of this behavior they are able to correctly accommodate the CMB data and other 
large-scale observations. 
I propose, therefore, that it would be reasonable to claim referential continuity between the 
two theories with respect to the theoretical entity `dark matter,’ insofar as that entity is invoked to 
explain the large-scale data. This claim is based on the fact that the relevant field in the Skordis 
& Złosnik gravitational action reproduces (by construction) the core-causal properties of `dark 
matter’ in the standard model. 
What about dark matter as it is invoked to explain the galactic-scale data? By assumption, 
this dark matter generates whatever gravitational field would be necessary under Newtonian dy-
namics to explain the kinematics of normal matter in observed galaxies. As near as anyone can 
determine, those observed kinematics are always correctly predicted by Milgromian dynamics 
(McGaugh 2014).  Thus, in respect to explanations of phenomena like galactic rotation curves, it 
would be appropriate to find core-causal continuity between `dark matter’ and the new descrip-
tion of gravity in Milgrom’s theory as well. 
But there is more to be said here. Standard-model cosmologists routinely postulate properties 
for the galaxy-scale dark matter that go beyond its ability to generate gravitational fields. One 
example, discussed in detail above, is the assumption that the dark matter consists of elementary 
particles and the prediction that those particles are interacting with normal matter on the Earth. 
No one engaged in direct-detection experiments would argue that the sought-after interactions 
would be expected if the particles do not exist. And standard-model cosmologists routinely as-
sume that, on scales corresponding to galaxies (as on larger scales), the dark matter both gener-
ates, and responds to, gravitational forces, in the same manner as a collisionless fluid of particles. 
The response of galaxy-scale dark matter to gravitational fields — generated both by the dark 
matter itself, and by the normal matter — is a necessary element of standard-model descriptions 
of a range of phenomena, including mergers between galaxies that are (assumed to be) embedded 
in dark-matter halos, decay of the orbits of satellite galaxies in the (postulated) dark halo of the 
Milky Way, etc. 
Now, what matters for the causal continuity argument is whether dark matter is invoked in 
solving problems or in explaining observations. But it is debatable whether any of the physical 
processes mentioned in the previous paragraph actually take place. This is obvious in the case of 
the particle-detection experiments,  and it is uncertain as well whether one can identify any sig12 -
natures of past orbital decay or mergers that require dark matter for their explaination (e.g. 
Kroupa 2012, 2015). Thus: while standard-model cosmologists often assume that the dark mat-
ter, on galactic scales, responds to gravity like a collisionless ensemble of particles, it is not clear 
that such behavior is implicated in the explanation of any observed phenomenon or in the solu-
tion of any problem.  13
The fact that the dark particles behave (at least in terms of experiments and observations to 
date) like unobservable entities suggests that we consider an alternate criterion for referential 
continuity. So-called `structural realism’ posits that what is preserved in theory change is the re-
lation between entities — as reflected in the theory’s mathematical structure, for instance — and 
that the real nature of those entities is either unknowable (`epistemic structural realism’) or that 
the relations are all there is (`ontic structural realism’) (Ladyman 1998). On this view, objects 
like dark-matter particles play only “a heuristic role allowing for the introduction of the struc-
tures which then carry the ontological weight” (French 1999, p. 204), and demonstrating continu-
ity under theory change would amount to demonstrating that the postulated relations — the 
“structure” — remains unchanged, without regard to the entities whose behavior is assumed to 
reflect that structure.   
Consider, then, the mathematical relations that standard-model cosmologists postulate for 
galactic-scale dark matter in its dynamical interactions with normal matter. When a massive body 
moves through an ensemble of particles, its gravitational force causes the trajectories of the par-
ticles to curve around behind it, leading to an overdensity that trails the massive body. That over-
density, in turn, exerts its own gravitational force back on the body and causes it to decelerate — 
a second order effect of the particles’ gravitation. This so-called `dynamical friction’ force exists 
both in collisionless and collisional fluids (like gases or liquids) and its mathematical description 
is quite similar in the two cases. That description has the form dV/dt ∝ −M𝝆F(V), where dV/dt is 
the rate of deceleration due to the friction, M is the mass of the body (e.g. satellite galaxy) under-
going deceleration, 𝝆 is the mass density of the background fluid (e.g. dark matter), and F(V) is a 
calculable function that describes the degree of background polarization due to passage of the 
massive body. A structural realist would want to emphasize that this equation contains nothing 
that refers to the mass, m, or number density, n, of the postulated particles — a consequence of 
the assumption that m is so small that the response of the particle `fluid’ to perturbations depends 
only on the product m×n = 𝝆. (Recall that the same was true in the case of the large-scale dark 
matter.) And so a structural realist would want to know whether the new field in RMOND im-
 No one would interpret a successful detection as anything other than a confirmation of the dark matter hypothesis, 12
and as a refutation of theories like Milgrom’s. What is less often considered is how to interpret the absence of any 
detection. Experimental physicists hardly ever refer to MOND, even though that theory provides a natural explana-
tion of their results. For instance, Abe et al. (2019), describing the latest results from the XMASS-1 liquid xenon 
experiment, begin their paper with “The existence of dark matter (DM) in the universe is inferred from many cosmo-
logical and astrophysical observations” and conclude by stating that they have succeeded in placing upper limits on 
the cross-section of interaction of the dark particles with nucleons; there is no suggestion that the lack of a detected 
signal might be due to non-existence of the dark particles. This attitude is typical.
 The lack of any clear evidence for these phenomena can, of course, be explained by assuming that dark matter 13
does not exist, and Kroupa argues just this way in his (2012, 2015).
plies a mathematically similar relation. The answer is “no”. On the scale of single galaxies, the 
new degrees of freedom in RMOND have an energy density that is negligible compared with that 
of the normal matter and their only influence on the normal matter is to modify its mutual inter-
actions, yielding Milgromian dynamics.  Hence there is nothing in RMOND that corresponds to 
the dynamical friction force due to dark matter in the standard model.  14
On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that continuity is lacking when it comes to the 
elements of the two theories that are invoked to explain the anomalous kinematics of galaxies. 
4. The best explanation
Realists typically assume that there exists a `logic of discovery’ followed by scientists. Since 
roughly the 1980s,  that logic has often been taken to be some variety of inductivism: `abduc15 -
tion’ or `inference to the best explanation’ (IBE). For instance, Psillos (2009, p. 5) writes: “It’s an 
implicit part of the realist thesis that the ampliative–abductive methods employed by scientists to 
arrive at their theoretical beliefs are reliable: they tend to generate approximately true beliefs and 
theories.“  16
Some writers make a distinction between abduction and IBE; I will ignore that distinction in 
what follows. But a distinction should be made between abductive inferences that are `local’ vs. 
`global,’ or `horizontal’ vs. `vertical’ (e.g. Hintikka 1968). An example of a local/horizontal in-
ference might be “I observe footprints; I infer that someone has walked past.” An example of a 
global/vertical inference might be “I observe precession of Mercury’s orbital periapsis; I infer the 
general theory of relativity.” The latter inference is far more ampliative—it goes much farther 
beyond the facts to be explained—than the former. It is fair to say that Milgrom’s proposed solu-
tion to the rotation-curve anomaly—which argues from the observed, asymptotic flatness of gal-
axy rotation curves to a wholesale rejection of the current theory of gravity—is closer to the lat-
ter case. 
What makes either sort of explanation `best’? Usually, the `best’ explanation is expected to 
be the most likely among the set of explanations that are deemed otherwise acceptable. Likeli-
hood, in turn, is to be evaluated on the basis of background knowledge or assumptions. For in-
stance, Niiniluoto (2005, p. 261) defines the principle of “high posterior probability” as: “Given 
evidence E, accept the explanation H of E such that H has the maximal posterior probability 
 This is similar to the cosmological behavior of the electromagnetic field. In the early, radiation-dominated era, the 14
energy density of the electromagnetic field was a dominant influence on the cosmological expansion, but today that 
field’s only signficant influence on the (normal) matter takes the form of Coulomb or radiative interactions.
 As recently as 1974, Lakatos wrote (p. 161): “at least among philosophers of science, Baconian method [i.e. in15 -
ductivist logic of discovery] is now only taken seriously by the most provincial and illiterate.” This view—closely 
associated with Popper’s critical rationalism—was commonly accepted throughout much of the 20th century and is 
still held by many scientists and philosophers (e.g. Jarvie et al. 1995; Sassower et al. 2019; Parusniková & Agassi 
2020), although it seems to have fallen out of favor with scientific realists.
 Note Psillos’s implicit assumption that scientists follow “ampliative-inductive methods.” That assumption is very 16
common in the realist literature; e.g. Chakravartty (2017, p. 20): “Inference to the best explanation … seems ubiqui-
tous in scientific practice.” Chakravartty gives no justification for his sweeping statement.
P(H/E&B) on E ” with B the background knowledge. The latter includes both known facts and 
accepted theories. Psillos (2009, p. 184) writes (italics added): 
To say that a certain hypothesis H is the best explanation of the evidence is to say, 
at least in part, that the causal-nomological story that H tells tallies best with 
background knowledge. This knowledge must contain all relevant information 
about, say, the types of causes that, typically, bring about certain effects, or the 
laws that govern certain phenomena etc. At least in non-revolutionary ap-
plications of IBE, the relevant background knowledge can have the resources to 
discriminate between better and worse potential explanations of the evidence.  
Note the qualification. Here, as in much of the realist literature, `background knowledge’ in-
cludes the existing, standard, theoretical framework (“the laws that govern certain phenomena”), 
and the `best’ explanation, at least in “non-revolutionary applications,” will be one that leaves 
that framework intact. Psillos reiterates: 
Suppose there are two potentially explanatory hypotheses H1 and H2 but the rele-
vant background knowledge favours H1 over H2. Unless there are specific reasons 
to challenge the background knowledge, H1 should be accepted as the best expla-
nation (italics added). 
According to Psillos, the `best’ explanation is one that targets the anomaly and explains it in a 
manner that does not require changes in accepted theory(ies). As Day and Kincaid (1994, p. 277) 
express it, this amounts to “evaluating any particular belief in terms of its fit with what else one 
believes.” 
Just such an attitude is apparent in Niiniluoto’s (2018, p. 147) discussion of the rotation-
curve anomaly. Niiniluoto presents the dark-matter hypothesis as an exemplar of (what Psillos 
might call) `non-revolutionary’ IBE: 
Already in 1933 Fritz Zwicky estimated that there is not enough ordinary matter 
to hold galactic clusters together, and postulated that there must additional “dark 
matter”. Further evidence was given in 1980 by Vera Rubin, who noted that the 
rotation curves for the velocities of stars and gas clouds are flat instead of de-
creasing with distance from the galactic center. Here theory T is Newton’s me-
chanics, and the initial condition I states the amount of ordinary baryonic matter 
in the universe. Anomalous evidence E, including observations about the expand-
ing universe and the anisotropies in the cosmic microwave background radiation, 
has led to the explanatory hypothesis that the universe consists only about 5% of 
ordinary matter and the rest is dark matter and dark energy. Here theory T is kept 
constant, but the initial condition I is revised into a hypothesis I*E about the 
amount of dark matter, so that T and I*E entail E. The majority of physicists ac-
cept this abductive inference to the best explanation … The alternative strategy is 
to accept the initial condition I about ordinary matter, but to revise Newton’s theo-
ry T*E, so that T*E and I entail E. Such revisions of the standard cosmological 
Lambda-GMD [sic] model have been proposed by modifying the Newtonian dy-
namics (Mordechai Milgrom’s MOND in 1983).  
Based on this passage, Niiniluoto seems to have misunderstood how ordinary (`baryonic’) matter 
enters into the two competing explanations.  Nevertheless it is clear what Niiniluoto is arguing: 17
that the `best’ explanation is, ipso facto, the one in which the current theory of gravity “is kept 
constant.” And (Niiniluoto implies) because that explanation is `best,’ it is the one that has been 
adopted by the “majority of physicists”.  18
The definition of `best’ advocated by Psillos, Niiniluoto and others is reasonable from the 
point of view of a realist who believes that successful, `mature,’ theories are essentially correct. 
Of course, if scientists in the past had been constrained to reason in this way, we would have 
been deprived of many of those current theories! But the realist’s attitude is, apparently, “That 
was then, this is now”: fundamental changes in our `mature’ theories are no longer to be expected 
(even though such changes were necessary to get us where we are today), and so an explanation 
of an observational anomaly that postulates such changes is ipso facto not `best.’ 
But there is a more important point to be made here. Niiniluoto ignores the fact that the Mil-
gromian explanation is predictive of rotation curve data, while the standard-model explanation is 
only accommodating of those data. Recall from the previous discussion how this came about: 
Milgrom initially crafted his postulates to yield the known, asymptotic flatness of rotation 
curves, but the same postulates imply that a galaxy’s kinematics should be fully predictable 
based on the observed (`baryonic’) mass alone, and this bold prediction has been shown again 
and again to be correct—as near as anyone can tell, Milgrom’s theory correctly predicts the rota-
tion curve of every observed galaxy. The standard-model explanation of the rotation-curve 
anomaly—which simply instructs the scientist to assume whatever amount and distribution of 
dark matter are required to explain whatever discrepancy arises, galaxy by galaxy—can boast no 
such predictive success. 
Now, advocates of IBE as a model for scientific discovery often acknowledge that the `best’ 
explanation, in addition to being the most likely, should also have this extra property: it should 
successfully predict novel facts. For instance, Niiniluto, in the same volume from which the pas-
sage above was taken, writes (p. 117): 
A hypothesis that explains our initial data, and is thereby confirmed by it to some 
extent, may still be ad hoc. To remove this doubt, the hypothesis should be inde-
pendently testable, i.e. it should either explain some old evidence or be successful 
 When explaining the rotation curve of a spiral galaxy, both the standard-model cosmologist, and the Milgromian 17
cosmologist, infer the distribution of ordinary matter using the same, well-established techniques. Those techniques 
require the application of auxiliary hypotheses (both observational and theoretical) but (barring personal ideosyncra-
cies) the same set of hypotheses will be adopted by both researchers. The spatially-averaged, or cosmological, densi-
ty of baryons, the quantity that Niiniluoto seems to be referring to in the quoted passage, does not enter into the 
problem for either researcher. 
 Niiniluoto’s choice of words admits of a different intended meaning: that we should judge the dark matter expla18 -
nation to be `best’ because it is the explanation that has been adopted by the majority of physicists.
in serious new tests. … one may argue that IBE as an acceptance rule should con-
tain an additional condition stating that the “best” hypothesis is one with both ex-
planatory and predictive power.  
Psillos (1999, pp. 105 and 173) concurs: 
we should not accept a hypothesis merely on the basis that it entails the evidence, 
if that hypothesis is the product of an ad hoc manoeuvre 
… The notion of empirical success that realists are happy with is such that it in-
cludes the generation of novel predictions which are in principle testable. 
But there is an obvious inconsistency here. The requirement that a theoretical explanation be 
fruitful—that it successfully predict new facts, in addition to the anomaly that it targets—con-
flicts with the requirement that it be a likely explanation of that anomaly. As Salmon (2001, p. 
121) puts it: 
In general, the bolder a hypothesis is, the smaller its probability will be on any 
given body of evidence. … Scientists often choose bolder hypotheses because of 
their informational value, even if this means opting for less probable hypotheses. 
Here Salmon is, of course, echoing Popper; as when Popper (1983, p. 256) challenged the induc-
tivist to explain 
why scientists invariably prefer a highly testable theory whose content goes far 
beyond all observed evidence to an ad hoc hypothesis, designed to explain just 
this evidence, and little beyond it, even though the latter must always be more 
probable than the former on any given evidence. How is the demand for a high 
informative content of a theory—for knowledge—to be combined with the de-
mand for a high probability, which means lack of content, and lack of knowledge? 
Charles Peirce (1878/1998, paragraph 120) came close to expressing the same idea: 
For after all, what is a likely hypothesis? It is one which falls in with our precon-
ceived ideas. But these may be wrong. Their errors are just what the scientific 
man is out gunning for more particularly. … The best hypothesis, in the sense of 
the one most recommending itself to the inquirer, is the one which can be the 
most readily refuted if it is false.   19
Peirce’s view aligns with Popper’s if we identify (as Popper did) the “most readily refuted” hy-
pothesis with the boldest one: the one that entails the highest number of testable propositions. 
 Nyrup (2015) proposes what he calls a “Peircean view of IBE”: that IBH “first and foremost justifies pursuing 19
hypotheses rather than accepting them as true.” 
The inconsistency between these two requirements for a `best’ explanation—that it have a 
high probability based on background assumptions, and that it successfully make predictions that 
go beyond those assumptions—is well illustrated by the two competing explanations of the rota-
tion-curve anomaly. Milgrom’s bold hypothesis can hardly be called `probable’, yet a great deal 
of its novel content has been experimentally confirmed; while the standard-model explanation of 
rotation curves, while (arguably) more probable given the background knowledge c. 1980, entails 
fewer testable propositions and has had a dismal record of anticipating new discoveries. 
This situation invites the questions: Can these two requirements be reconciled? If not: which 
is more fundamental? And which should we respect when deciding on the `best’ explanation of 
the rotation curve anomaly? 
It is interesting to examine the astrophysical literature. Milgrom (1983a,b,c), when introduc-
ing his three postulates, nowhere suggests that those postulates are `probable’ or `best’. He gives 
two motivations for his proposed modification of Newton’s laws: (i) that the dark matter hypoth-
esis is ad hoc; and (ii) that the discrepancies that are explained by postulating dark matter occur 
in regimes of very low acceleration, where there are no, independent tests of the validity of New-
ton’s (or Einstein’s) theory, hence it is not unreasonable to consider modifying that theory. Fur-
thermore Milgrom stated clearly that his novel predictions could be, and should be, experimen-
tally tested and he noted that for many of them, the tests would be “straightforward.” 
Without taking too much license, we can summarize Milgrom’s justificatory arguments from 
1983 as follows: 
1. The first tests, c. 1975, of Newton’s laws in the regime of low acceleration failed: 
galaxy rotation curves were predicted to decline at large radii, but were found to be asymp-
totically flat.  
2. Explanations of the anomaly that postulate the existence of dark matter are ad hoc, 
since they instruct the scientist simply to assume whatever distribution of dark matter is 
needed to accommodate the discrepancy.  
3. One can explain the anomaly in a different way, by postulating a modification of 
Newton’s laws.  
4. That hypothesis entails a number of novel, testable predictions, as follows: … 
 
So stated, Milgrom’s argument would seem a poor example of IBE, or indeed of `inference’ of 
any kind. Milgrom took a shot in the dark, so to speak, with no obvious expectation of success, 
and he assigned the entire warrant for acceptance of his conjecture to future confirmation of its 
novel predictions.  
Perhaps this is unsurprising given Psillos’s restriction of IBE to “non-revolutionary ap-
plications.” Milgrom’s proposal is nothing if not revolutionary. But it is striking how well Mil-
grom’s methodology aligns with a different epistemological school: the critical rationalism of 
Karl Popper. Popper, of course, did not believe in a logic of discovery: only of justification. As 
opposed to the inductivists, he found no intrinsic merit in a hypothesis being likely: 
My theory of preference has nothing to do with a preference for the `more proba-
ble’ hypothesis. … the `better’ or `preferable’ hypothesis will, more often than 
not, be the more improbable one (1972, p. 17). 
What mattered to Popper was that a new hypothesis have more content—that it entail more 
(testable) predictions—than the hypothesis it replaces: 
the new theory should be independently testable. That is to say, apart from ex-
plaining all the explicanda which the new theory was designed to explain, it must 
have new and testable consequences (preferably consequences of a new kind); it 
must lead to the prediction of phenomena which have not so far been observed 
(1963, p. 241) 
and furthermore that at least some of the novel content be experimentally confirmed; that is, that 
the modified theory pass some new, and severe, tests: 
if the progress of science is to continue, and its rationality not to decline, we need 
not only successful refutations, but also positive successes. We must, that is, man-
age reasonably often to produce theories that entail new predictions, especially 
predictions of new effects, new testable consequences, suggested by the new theo-
ry and never thought of before (ibid, p. 243). 
Popper, like Milgrom in his papers from 1983, pinned the entire warrant for acceptability of an 
explanatory hypothesis on its (future) success: on how well it stands up to tests: to attempted 
refutations. No additional merit accrues to a hypothesis on the grounds that it is `best’ in the 
sense of `a priori most probable.’  In Popper’s (1972, p. 18) words, “Of course, one may call the 
preferable theory the more `probable’ one: words do not matter, as long as one is not misled by 
them.” 
Paul Feyerabend was famously averse to methodological strictures, but there is one method-
ological rule that he argued for, again and again (1963; 1964a,b; 1965; 1970; 1978): When faced 
with an experimental anomaly whose refuting character can not be definitely established, he said, 
prefer the hypothesis that explains the results without contrivance and which links that explana-
tion to other observable phenomena. Feyerabend coined the term “effective refutation” to de-
scribe situations like this: 
The reason why a refutation through alternatives is stronger is easily seen. The 
direct case is “open,” in the sense that a different explanation of the apparent fail-
ure of the theory (of the inconsistency between the theory and certain singular 
statements) might seem to be possible. The presence of an alternative makes this 
attitude much more difficult, if not impossible, for we possess now not only the 
appearance of failure (viz., the inconsistency) but also an explanation, on the ba-
sis of a successful theory, of why failure actually occurred (1965, pp. 249-250). 
Feyerabend illustrated his proposed methodological rule using the (historical) example of 
Brownian motion, but his rule would seem to apply perfectly to several of the experimental re-
sults described here (Merritt 2021a). For instance: the non-detection of dark particles constitutes 
a (non-refuting) anomaly for the standard cosmological model, but it is naturally explained by 
Milgrom’s theory, and Milgrom’s explanation also entails a number of other successful predic-
tions, e.g. the full rotation curve of the Galaxy, which are not matched by the standard model. As 
in the case of Popper’s theory of corroboration, Feyerabend’s rule for theory choice makes no 
reference to the `best’ explanation except insofar as the `best’ explanation is the one that is em-
pirically most successful. 
Given these examples, one wonders what is to be gained by calling an inference `best,’ so 
long as it satisfies the other condition that Psillos and Niiniluoto (and Popper and Feyerabend) 
identify as essential—success at making novel predictions. Perhaps the methodological rule, 
“Accept a new hypothesis only if it passes new tests” is unpalatable to realists, since it effective-
ly removes the `inference’ from `inference to the best explanation.’ As Lakatos (1968, p. 388) 
noted, “It is up to us to devise bold theories; it is up to Nature whether to corroborate or to refute 
them.”  
5 Two arguments for realism 
5.1 Novelty = truth
Many philosophers have based arguments for scientific realism on the empirical success of 
theories (Putnam 1975; Musgrave 1988; Lipton 1990; White 2003; Hitchcock & Sober 2004; 
Barnes 2008). In Roger White’s (2003, p. 654) words, “one central argument for scientific real-
ism claims that the predictive success of scientific theories in general is significant evidence for 
their truth.” 
Perhaps no one has argued more strongly for the special epistemic status of successful,  novel 
predictions than Jared Leplin (1997). Leplin’s thesis is neatly captured by the title of his book: A 
Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. He writes (p. 100; italics added): 
One way that a theory displays explanatory power is by successfully predicting a 
result from which its provenance is free. If no other theories predict even qualita-
tive generalizations of the result, then there is an explanatory challenge that the 
theory uniquely meets. In this situation, if we are not to credit the theory with 
some measure of truth, then we have no way to understand how the theory is able 
to meet this challenge. … Novel success is the exception to the antirealist strategy 
of proliferating explanations of success; it cannot be explained without crediting 
the theory that achieves it with some measure of truth.  
As this passage suggests, Leplin sets two conditions (which he views as sufficient, if not neces-
sary) for a predicted experimental result to be considered novel. First, following Elie Zahar 
(1973) and Lakatos & Zahar (1976), Leplin proposes an “independence condition”: that the theo-
ry explaining the result should not depend on knowledge of the result for its content or develop-
ment. (In Zahar’s words, the theory was not “cleverly engineered to yield the known facts”; in 
Leplin’s formulation, the novel result is “one whose antecedent availability a theory need not de-
pend on” (p. 49).) The success of a theory in explaining a result that was used in the theory’s 
construction may be explainable without requiring the theory to be true. 
And following Alan Musgrave (1974), Leplin proposes a “uniqueness condition”: that at the 
time a theory predicts some observed regularity in nature (as opposed to a singular event), there 
exists no alternative theory that “provides a viable reason to expect” that regularity. “Truth is not 
to be attributed to a theory in explanation of its explanatory success if the result explained can 
also be explained another way” (pp. 64-5). (In Musgrave’s words (p. 15): “in assessing the evi-
dential support of a new theory we should compare it, not with 'background knowledge' in gen-
eral, but with the old theory which it challenges.”)  
Leplin then argues (p. 102-103) for a link between novel success, as he defines it, and what 
he calls “partial truth”:  
  
My argument defends the inference from a theory's novel success to its partial 
truth, interpreted as degree of representational accuracy. Minimally, I am com- 
mitted to the claim that the greater the novel success uncompromised by empiri- 
cal failure that a theory sustains, the less likely are the theory's predictive and ex-
planatory mechanisms to be wholly unrepresentative of the physical entities  
and processes actually responsible for the relevant observations.  
(He continues “I am vague by default as to how much novel success merits what level of confi-
dence in representational success.”) 
As Leplin notes, his argument can make claims both for specific theories, and, at the meta-
level, for science as a whole. In the case of the science of cosmology, those claims pull in oppo-
site directions. On the one hand, Leplin would argue that it is appropriate to attribute some mea-
sure of truth to MOND. Several of Milgrom’s successful predictions—the BTFR, the CSDR, the 
RAR among them—clearly satisfy both of Leplin’s conditions for novelty. Information about 
these observed regularities did not contribute in any way to the formulation of Milgrom’s theory: 
indeed they were not observationally established until some years after 1983. And, as discussed 
above, the competing theory (the standard cosmological model) provides no “viable reason to 
expect” these regularities to exist. And at least since the addition (c. 1980) of the postulates relat-
ing to dark matter, the standard model can claim no comparable successes of novel prediction. So 
Leplin’s argument would imply that we interpret Milgrom’s theory, and not the standard cosmo-
logical model, in a realistic way: as a (at least partially) true representation of nature. 
It is common to find comparisons of the two theories on the basis of their ability to accom-
modate the observations, without regard to predictive novelty. Many cosmologists (e.g. van den 
Bosch & Dalcanton 2000; Dodelson 2011; McGaugh 2015; Freese 2017; Bertone & Hooper 
2018) and philosophers (e.g. Massimi 2018; De Baerdemaeker & Boyd 2020) have noted that 
one theory successfully accounts for data in certain regimes (galaxies; galaxy groups) while the 
other successfully accounts for data in complementary regimes (the early universe; large-scale 
structure). This observation is often followed by a sentiment like “Both theories have had their 
successes and their failures. Let’s give due credit to both!” That attitude may be socially com-
mendable but it is epistemically bankrupt. Both theories may be false but at most one of them 
can be true.  The `success’ of (at least) one of these theories is a red herring: it can be telling us 
nothing about that theory’s validity. 
Given recent developments (e.g. Skordis & Złosnik 2020), there is no longer any basis for 
claiming that Milgrom’s theory is successful only on galactic scales. But even if the two theories 
were equally successful at explaining all existing observations, Leplin’s criteria would still lend 
us a warrant for favoring one (Milgrom’s) over the other as a (partially) true representation of 
nature. And by favoring a realist interpretation of Milgrom’s theory, those criteria simultaneously 
lend support to the anti-realist position: that current, mature theories in the physical sciences, 
even successful ones (like the ΛCDM model), are susceptible to replacement by ontologically 
incommensurate ones. 
5.2 Convergence 
A second argument for realism is often invoked in the context of the atomistic hypothesis. 
Jean Baptiste Perrin (1913) noted that—under the assumption that atoms exist—one could inter-
pret the results of varied experiments as determinations of Avogadro’s number, and that there 
was good numerical agreement between the values so obtained. He concluded from this coinci-
dence that “the real existence of the molecule is given a probability bordering on 
certainty” (1916, p. 205-6). Wesley Salmon (1984, p. 220) endorsed Perrin’s argument: 
If there were no such micro-entities as atoms, molecules, and ions, then these dif-
ferent experiments designed to ascertain Avogadro’s number would be genuinely 
independent experiments, and the striking numerical agreement in their results 
would constitute an utterly astonishing coincidence. 
Losee (2004, 2005) argued that a similar claim could be made about early experimental determi-
nations of Planck’s constant. He used the term `convergence’ to describe the phenomenon of di-
verse experimental determinations agreeing on a single value for a proposed, new constant of 
nature. 
In the case of Planck’s constant, there is no physical entity the real existence of which is in 
question. In fact Losee did not argue (as Salmon had) for a link between convergence and entity 
realism. Losee proposed rather that an instance of convergence constitutes “a sufficient condition 
of progressive theory-replacement … what is warranted by the convergence criterion is transi-
tions between one type of theory to a second” (2004, p. 156-7).  
We can try to apply arguments like Salmon’s and Losee’s to the two cosmological theories. 
The standard cosmological model, like the atomistic theory of matter, postulates the existence of 
a new entity: dark matter. And Milgrom’s theory, like theories of energy quantization, postulates 
the existence of a new constant of nature: Milgrom’s constant, a0. 
First consider MOND. Under the assumption that Milgrom’s theory is correct, one can use its 
predictions to determine the value of a0 from various sorts of observational data. For instance, a0 
appears as an adjustable parameter when fitting any galaxy’s rotation curve, and one sort of con-
vergence would consist of demonstrating that the same value is obtained for every galaxy, modu-
lo errors. Li et al. (2018) and McGaugh et al. (2018) find not only that MOND successfully pre-
dicts rotation curves (with an average accuracy of 13%) but that the data are best fit by assuming 
the same value of a0 for all galaxies. 
Methods that combine data from a large sample of galaxies are able to determine a0 with 
greater precision. For instance, one can `read off’ a0 directly from the vertical normalization of 
the BTFR as plotted in the left panel of Figure 1. One finds a value consistent with the rotation 
curve fits, but with less uncertainty: 
a0 = (1.29 ± 0.06) ×10-10 m s-2 
(Lelli et al. 2016a). Consistent results are obtained from fitting to the RAR and the CSDR (Mc-
Gaugh et al. 2016; Lelli et al. 2016b). 
One can object that these experimental determinations are not as diverse or as independent as 
those cited by Perrin or by Planck. Some rather different methods for determining a0 have been 
discussed, although all have substantially larger (systematic) errors. One example is the ob-
served, upper limit on the surface brightness of galaxy disks (e.g. Davies 1990) which (under 
Milgrom’s theory) can be plausibly linked to a0 via an evolutionary argument (Brada & Milgrom 
1999); the value of a0 so inferred is only approximate but it is consistent (at a factor-of-two level) 
with the value given above. Other approximate techniques are discussed by Famaey & McGaugh 
(2012). 
Next, consider how arguments like those of Salmon and Losee might be applied to the stan-
dard cosmological model, which postulates the existence of a new entity: dark matter. Now, a 
realist (or indeed almost any experimental physicist) is likely to argue that the strongest case for 
the reality of dark matter would be based on laboratory detection of the dark particles and not on 
a convergence criterion like Salmon’s. But the failure (so far) to detect the particles does not in-
hibit standard-model cosmologists from arguing that dark matter must exist. The key observa-
tion, for them, is the CMB fluctuation spectrum. The mean, or cosmological, density of dark 
matter, ρdm, is determined from those data via a parameter fit. The fitting parameter is the dimen-
sionless quantity Ωdm where 
ρdm = 3H2 /(8𝜋G) Ωdm  
and H is the cosmological expansion parameter (`Hubble’s constant’); one typically sees the re-
sult expressed as the product Ωdm h2 with h ≡ H/(100 km s-1 Mpc-1). The value of Ωdm h2 as de-
termined from CMB data is 0.1187 ± 0.0017 (Schneider 2015, Table 8.1) — a remarkably high, 
formal precision. 
One could choose Ωdm  as the `new constant of nature’ and look for convergence. Unfortu-
nately there do not exist any independent methods for determining Ωdm that are of usefully high 
precision. 
But there is another fitting parameter which — surprising as it may seem — is a good proxy 
for Ωdm and which can be determined in a number of independent ways. It is the parameter that 
specifies the density of normal (`baryonic’) matter, ρb, where 
ρb = 3H2 /(8𝜋G) Ωb . 
When analyzing the CMB spectrum, the best-fitting values of Ωb and Ωdm are strongly correlated; 
in other words, the value inferred for Ωdm is highly dependent on the value assigned to Ωb, and 
vice-versa. Furthermore there are a number of methods that can be used to estimate the baryon 
density with reasonably high precision, including methods that (like Perrin’s examples) are based 
on very different physical arguments. 
Before about 2000, the standard method for estimating Ωb was based on nucleosynthesis ar-
guments. The abundances of the light nuclear species, like helium or lithium, is believed to have 
been set during the rapid phase of big-bang nucleosynthesis (BBN) when the universe was a few 
minutes old. The predicted abundances depend on the total density of nucleons, hence on Ωb. 
Those predictions can be compared with the measured abundances to determine Ωb. Since the 
method yields independent estimates of Ωb for each nuclear species examined, a test of conver-
gence is possible even without comparison with the CMB-based result.  
The biggest difficulty in applying the method is ensuring that the measured abundances have 
not been affected by processes of creation or destruction after the era of BBN. For technical (but 
fascinating) reasons, the strongest case can be made for lithium-7 (see Spite et al. 2012). Esti-
mates of Ωb based on lithium were made as early as the 1970s and have remained remarkably 
unchanged since then; one current estimate (Sbordone et al. 2010) is 
Ωbh2 = 0.0139 ± 0.0016 . 
Between about 1980 and 2000, abundance determinations of deuterium, helium-3 and helium-4 
gave consistent results, although with larger uncertainties. This convergence of measured values 
of Ωb (astrophysicists used the term `concordance’) was felt to lend strong support to the big 
bang model — although the fact that the nucleosynthesis argument depended only on the baryon 
density meant that no claims could be made about dark matter. 
Another method for estimating Ωb (also unaffected by assumptions about dark matter) con-
sists of carrying out a census of normal matter in the nearby universe. Here the main difficulty is 
ensuring that all `baryons’ have been detected (and none have been double-counted).  The study 
by Shull et al. (2012), considered by many astrophysicists to be the most careful and complete of 
its kind, found 
Ωbh2 = 0.0159 ± 0.0029 , 
consistent with the determination based on lithium abundance and with the pre-2000 `concor-
dance’ value. 
Unfortunately, the currently-accepted value of Ωb based on the CMB is substantially larger 
than either of these estimates: 
Ωbh2 = 0.02214 ± 0.00024 . 
There is currently only one other method of estimating Ωb that yields a result consistent with the 
CMB-based value. The abundance of deuterium can be combined with the equations of nucle-
osynthesis to yield estimates of Ωb. Deuterium is a problematic nuclide to use in this way be-
cause of its ease of destruction by nuclear reactions, even at temperatures that occur in the at-
mospheres of stars. Estimates of Ωb using deuterium were consistent (within the large uncertain-
ties) with the lithium estimate before about 2000, but after that date, estimates (or at least a sub-
set of them) have rather mysteriously converged on the CMB value.  20
Standard-model cosmologists acknowledge the failures of convergence of independent de-
terminations of Ωb: they refer to the failures as the `lithium problem’ and the `missing-baryons 
problem’. But recognition that a problem exists has not, apparently, generated in any uncertainty 
in their minds about the correctness of the CMB-based determination. For instance, Fields (2011, 
p. 48) writes:  
measurements of the cosmic microwave background (CMB) radiation have pre-
cisely determined the cosmological baryon and total matter contents … It is diffi-
cult to overstate the cosmological impact of the stunningly precise CMB mea-
surements. 
In summary: as in the case of the novelty argument, the convergence argument—in support-
ing the reality of Milgrom’s theory—works against the realists’ belief that current, `mature’ theo-
ries in the physical scientists are approximately correct. 
6 Discussion 
As discussed above, the fact that the properties of dark matter in the standard cosmological 
model are only vaguely specified, and the reliance of that theory (much more than Milgrom’s) on 
auxiliary hypotheses to explain observations of galaxies and galactic systems, make it difficult to 
determine whether the two theories are empirically equivalent, even if that term is limited to ex-
isting (as opposed to all possible) observations. But an anti-realist position does not demand a 
demonstration of empirical equivalence. As Stanford (2006, p. 17) emphasizes, the threat posed 
by theory underdetermination to the realism thesis 
 The apparent conflict between the lithium- and deuterium-based estimates of Ωb is independent of any assump20 -
tions about dark matter and so will be equally puzzling to Milgromian and standard-model researchers. It is current-
ly unclear whether RMOND requires the same Ωb as the standard model in order to fit the CMB spectrum, or 
whether (for instance) it might fit those data with the lower, pre-2000 concordance value. If so, the `lithium problem’ 
and the `missing baryons problem’ would disappear but they would be replaced by a `deuterium problem.’ 
was not initially concerned with the possibility of empirical equivalents at all, of 
course, but instead with any alternatives sharing the impressive empirical 
achievements of our own best scientific theories. … our grounds for belief in a 
given theory would be no less severely challenged if we believed that there are 
one or more alternatives that are not empirically equivalent to it but are none-
theless consistent with or even equally well confirmed by all of the actual evi-
dence we happen to have in hand at the moment. Following Larry Sklar (1975), 
we might call this a transient underdetermination predicament: that is, one in 
which the theories underdetermined by the existing evidence are empirically in-
equivalent and could therefore be differentially confirmed by the accumulation of 
further evidence.  
I would argue that the current situation in the field of cosmology is, to adopt Sklar’s words, a 
“predicament of transient underdetermination”: that is: that the two competing theories are, in 
fact, empirically inequivalent but that existing data do not yet conclusively favor one theory over 
the other. Nevertheless, following Stanford’s argument, the impressive predictive successes of 
Milgrom’s alternative theory already pose a significant challenge to the realist position that cur-
rent, mature theories in the physical sciences are likely to be correct. 
Suppose we assume for the sake of argument that the standard cosmological model is due to 
be overturned, by Milgrom’s theory or by some variant of that theory. What aspect(s) of Mil-
grom’s theory are likely to be retained following that transition? Leplin’s argument from novel 
success warrants only (in Leplin’s words) a belief in some degree of “representational accuracy” 
for the novelly-successful theory. But other philosophers (e.g. Kitcher 1993; Psillos 1999) have 
argued for `selective confirmation’: that there is a warrant for believing those parts or aspects of 
a theory that are responsible for their predictive successes, and hence that those parts are likely to 
be preserved following theory change. In the case of Milgrom’s theory, it is easy to identify the 
relevant parts, since the successes of novel prediction mostly follow from the theory in its early, 
non-relativistic formulation: that is: from the postulates in his 1983 papers that imply the BTFR, 
the RAR, and the algorithm for prediction of galaxy rotation curves (Merritt 2021b). 
Whether or not Milgrom’s theory is true (or ‘true’), by testing the novel predictions of the 
theory, astrophysicists have been led to a number of discoveries that almost certainly would not 
have been made by standard-model cosmologists, at least in the near future and possibly ever. 
Pace Psillos, Niiniluoto and other realists, this would seem reason enough not to counsel cos-
mologists to be timid in their theorizing. And any philosopher, realist or otherwise, should be 
willing to acknowledge the possibility that even a theory as mature and as successful as the stan-
dard cosmological model might turn out to be fundamentally wrong. 
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